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Osservatorio Nessuno OdV

Software that leaves no trace

Osservatorio Nessuno is a volunteer-run organization with a mission to protect privacy and anonymity, while supporting and promoting digital rights and related technologies. We host Tor exit nodes, conduct research and analysis on digital threats, and advocate for human and digital rights.

Some of our recent work has focused on addressing security and legal threats faced by Tor Exit node operators. Running Tor relays requires constant work against adversaries, private and state-backed, who try to undermine the network by attacking the nodes that make it up. On top of that, some operators have to deal with seizures, raids, and direct physical access to hardware.

Osservatorio Nessuno has approached this problem by breaking it into four subgoals: physical control of nodes to detect seizures, a dedicated space for that purpose, control over the network stack, and minimal stored information. In order to control the physical access to our hardware, we own a small dedicated warehouse, operate our own autonomous system with owned IP addresses, and lease fiber directly from our location to our BGP router at an internet exchange.

We also developed software to run Tor nodes exclusively from RAM, with keys sealed against physical attacks using TPM chips via our tool Patela. The boot chain is built entirely from open-source components, Coreboot and Stboot, each measurable and verifiable. At runtime, Patela handles node identity, configuration distribution, and key management without any persistent storage.

What we get are relays that run in RAM, can prove what they're running through hardware attestation, and don’t leave traces when powered off.

Impact

Demonstrates that privacy infrastructure can exist outside commercial hosting environments, with seizure-resistant, attestable Tor relays.

How your donation helps

The project runs entirely on volunteer time. Support would allow us to expand from a single location to multiple ones, and more bandwidth means more servers and better network equipment, since everything grows proportionally.

On the development side, dedicated time would allow us to significantly harden Patela's security model and accelerate work on the surrounding tooling. It would also let us replace additional pieces of the boot and runtime stack with auditable, attestation-capable components, reducing trust in third-party software further.

The methodology extends beyond Tor and applies to any operator needing trustworthy, seizure-resistant infrastructure, demonstrating that privacy infrastructure can exist outside commercial hosting environments.

Recent donations

  • $4 to Osservatorio Nessuno OdV via t-ZEC
    3h ago
  • $17 to Osservatorio Nessuno OdV via t-ZEC
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